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1. Introduction 
  Developing countries have experienced major changes in their tax systems in the last four 
decades.  These changes have been largely attributed to forces that include changes in major 
economic variables, government policies, demographic and other socio-economic trends and 
domestic and international political environment.  However, there has also been a substantial 
variation in these forces across different countries that have widely different tax structures.  It is 
indeed shown that the tax structures of developing countries vary extensively (Tanzi, 1992; Zee, 
1996 and Tanzi and Zee, 2000).  As recently mentioned in the literature, it is surprising to see so 
few studies that examine tax structure changes across countries (Volkerink and DeHaan, 1999; 
Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000; Kenny and Winer, 2001).  To set the stage for an analysis of tax 
policy in developing countries, Tanzi and Zee (2000) listed four major challenges to efficient tax 
systems in developing countries.  The first is the difficulty in income tax base calculations due to 
irregular earnings.  The second difficulty is the absence of “well-educated and well-trained” staff 
in tax administration.  The third is the “informal structure of the economy” and difficulties in 
policy analysis due to lack of data or problems with existing data.  The final challenge noted, is 
uneven income distribution in developing countries, which prevents enactment of progressive 
taxes.  Tanzi and Zee concluded “tax policy is often the art of the possible rather than the pursuit 
of the optimal.”   
  This paper examines the relationship between tax structures, and governance and 
demographics as two forces that are strongly related to the abovementioned challenges to 
developing country tax systems.  The objective of this study is to determine whether these two 
forces can explain the variation in the tax structures of countries, particularly in the Middle East 
  1and North Africa (MENA), over a period of two decades.  To date, these links have been left 
mainly unexamined.  For example, Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) noted that previous studies 
focused on the effect of corruption on overall taxation levels but not on tax composition. 
  There are good reasons for a curiosity in the MENA countries as a group for analysis and 
comparison.  First, the MENA countries differ considerably from both OECD and other Non-
OECD countries in their economic and demographic structures, trade orientation and quality of 
governance and they differ among themselves as well.  The MENA region includes countries 
that have unique characteristics such as economic dependency on sizeable oil reserves, poor 
governance and astounding growth in the working-age population
1 mainly due to high 
population growth in the region.  A study by Abed (1998) gives a comprehensive overview of 
the trade liberalization experience of Southern Mediterranean Region (SMR) countries through 
EU’s Association Agreements.  While Abed discussed various tax reform proposals needed to 
counteract revenue losses from tariff reductions, he did not provide an empirical estimation of 
the effect of trade liberalization on the tax structures.
2  In a recent study, Tosun (2004a) did not a 
find a major impact of trade openness on the tax structures of MENA countries, pointing to other 
forces that might have been dominant for these countries.  Thus, a broader examination of the tax 
structures of MENA countries would be a natural extension of previous research in this area, 
making it possible to examine the roles of demographic changes and quality of governance in 
determining the tax structures.      
  The paper is structured as follows.  The next section reviews recent trends in governance, 
demographics and tax structures in the MENA, OECD and other Non-OECD countries.  Section 
3 provides the theoretical underpinnings that guide the empirical analysis.  Section 4 describes 
                                                 
1 Dhonte, Bhattacharya and Yousef (2000) call this a “demographic explosion”.   
2 Eltony (2002) examined the tax structures and tax efforts of only Arab countries. 
  2the variables in the empirical analysis, the empirical specification and the data.  Section 5 
presents the empirical results and provides interpretations.  The final section provides concluding 
remarks and discusses policy implications of the results. 
2. Trends in the MENA Countries 
Quality of Governance 
Governance is a term that is widely used in various circles including the academia and 
the popular media.  To understand the concept of good governance, it is imperative to define 
governance first.  Governance is defined in the 2002 Arab Human Development Report as “the 
exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all 
levels” (UNDP and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 2002: 105).  Referring to 
the UNDP, the same report lists participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, equity, 
accountability and strategic vision as characteristics of good governance.  In turn, good 
governance is defined as “a set of societal institutions that fully represent the people, interlinked 
by a solid network of institutional regulation and accountability (with ultimate accountability to 
the people), whose purpose is to achieve the welfare of all members of society” (UNDP and 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 2002: 106).  The next question is to find a 
good measure of governance that can be used to compare countries over long time periods.  Such 
a measure is necessary for statistical comparisons as well as for rigorous econometric analysis.  
One measure that meets the criteria is the quality of governance indicators that are produced by 
Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center in the University of Maryland, which are based on the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data released by the PRS Group.   
This dataset (from now on the IRIS data) includes the following variables - corruption in 
government, rule of law (law and order tradition), bureaucratic quality, ethnic tensions, 
  3repudiation of contracts by government and risk of appropriation - and covers 130 countries over 
the period 1982 through 1997.  Table 1 shows these variables and the IRIS data averaged for the 
MENA, OECD and other Non-OECD countries for the periods 1982-84, 1988-90, 1995-97, 
1982-89 and 1990-97.  The additional variable called “quality of governance” is the average of 
corruption in government, rule of law and bureaucratic quality
3 and has been recently used as a 
measure of governance quality (Knack, 2001).  Components of the quality of governance in the 
IRIS data, particularly corruption in government,” were used in many other studies including 
Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), Mauro (1996) and Knack and Keefer (1995).   
Table 1 shows that the MENA countries have performed poorly in almost all governance 
indicators compared to both OECD countries and other Non-OECD countries.  However, these 
countries also exhibited significant improvement in these indicators from 1982 to 1997.  The 
improvement in governance in the MENA countries is particularly noteworthy for the 1990-1997 
period, which is a trend that is not seen at the same magnitude in other comparison countries.  
This confirms the uniqueness of the MENA countries in terms of the quality of governance. 
Governance and Taxation 
The relationship between governance and taxes has been a topic of interest in the Middle 
Eastern and North African civilizations for centuries.  The famous vizier of the Seljuk Turks, 
Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1092)
4, wrote in his Siyasat-nama
5 (about good governance and taxation) 
that “the ruler should not oppress his subjects by levying illegal taxes” and it is the ruler’s “duty 
to see that the governors of the provinces, the tax collectors and the soldiers do not take recourse 
                                                 
3 There is high positive correlation between these three measures.  The correlation coefficients between these 
variables are as follows: corruption-bureaucratic quality (0.84), corruption-rule of law (0.77), rule of law-
bureaucratic quality (0.78). 
4 Of Persian descent, his name translates as “the order of the state”. His name at birth was Abn Ali al-Hasan bin Ali 
ibn Ishâq al-Tusi.   
5 This book was translated to English by Hubert Darke as “The Book of Government or Rules for Kings” (see 
Nizam al-Mulk, 1978). 
  4to illegal taxation and oppressive extortion” (Khan, 1989).  The famous fourteenth century Arab 
philosopher and statesman Ibn Khaldun, whose writings on history and economics, including the 
theory of taxation, later echoed in the writings of the classical economists, highlighted the 
importance of tax administration in the chapter of his Muqaddimah on dynasties, royal authority 
and government ranks.  Referring to the political power of the ministry of financial operations 
and taxation, Ibn Khaldun asserts “the person who holds the office of tax collections has a good 
part of the royal authority for himself” (Ibn Khaldun, 1967: 198-201). 
  Governance is still a critical issue for today’s MENA countries.  According to the Middle 
East and North Africa regional report by Leenders and Sfakianasis (2003) published in 
Transparency International’s 2003 edition of the Global Corruption Report
6, corruption in the 
MENA countries thrives “in virtually all domains of economic, administrative and political 
activity” (Leenders and Sfakianasis, 2003: 205).  The report describes this as “endemic 
corruption” and notes that polls on business people throughout the region show taxes and 
corruption as two important challenges to business environment in the MENA countries.  
  As a prelude to the empirical analysis in the following sections, Figures 1 through 8 
provide scatter plots of the sample period (1982-97) averages that show the simple relationship 
between quality of governance and the level and structure of taxes in the MENA countries.  
Figure 1 shows a negative relationship between tax ratio (ratio of taxes to GDP) and quality of 
governance.  Similar negative relationships are seen in Figures 6 and 8 for the share of domestic 
taxes on goods and services and the share of other taxes.  All other tax shares in Figures 2 
through 5 and Figure 7 show a positive relationship with the quality of governance.  These 
figures also show the wide variation in both these tax shares and quality of governance for the 
MENA countries. 
                                                 
6 The 2003 Global Corruption Report can be accessed at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/gcr2003.htm. 
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Demography 
  As the 2003 Arab Human Development Report shows, Arab countries exhibit unique 
demographic characteristics.  Despite significant decreases, they have higher fertility and 
population growth rates than other countries and regions.  It is also noted that they have a 
significantly younger age structure.  The report concludes that this can present a “demographic 
gift or a demographic curse” depending on whether the high population growth and fertility can 
be transformed into human wealth through capital investments and technological progress.  
Similarly, in a recent study, Dhonte, Bhattacharya and Yousef (2000) argue that the expected 
“explosion” in working-age population in the Middle East present challenges as well as 
opportunities for these countries.  The authors argue that the opportunities can flourish given the 
right institutional developments in the region.  International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) September 
2004 issue of the World Economic Outlook provides further hope that working-age population 
increase in the Middle East could have a significant positive impact on growth in real GDP per 
capita between 2000 and 2050.  The report shows that this contrasts significantly with expected 
slow GDP per capita growth in countries with aging populations. 
  While these recent reports tell us about the uniqueness of demographic trends in the 
Middle East or Arab countries and their significance in terms of economic performance, it would 
be useful to look at selected population statistics for the MENA countries as a whole.  Table 2 
shows comparative statistics on population growth, labor force, 15-64 and 0-14 age groups and 
urban population for the MENA, OECD and other Non-OECD countries.
7  The MENA countries 
have consistently had the highest population growth rates and the highest share of population in 
                                                 
7 Another important indicator, the unemployment rate, is not shown due to lack of data in the World Development 
Indicators. 
  6the 0-14 age group compared to other country groups throughout the 1982-97 period.  However, 
there has also been a considerable decrease in the population growth rate in the MENA countries 
between 1982 and 1997.  In addition, the share of population in the 15-64 age group and the 
share of labor force in total population have been below the corresponding shares in other 
country groups throughout the 1982-97 period.  The share of urban population in total population 
falls between the shares for OECD countries and other Non-OECD countries. 
Tax Revenues 
There have been considerable changes in the tax structures of both MENA and other 
countries.  Table 3 shows the tax structure changes for a selection of 61 countries between 1982-
84 and 1995-97.
8  Description of tax classifications are provided in a footnote to Table 3. 
Comparing first the differences in tax composition in 1995-97 across countries, OECD 
countries rely significantly less on international trade taxes and more on income taxes compared 
to all other groups.  Also, OECD countries draw more tax revenue from social security 
contributions compared to other countries.  There is considerably greater reliance on trade taxes 
in MENA countries compared to all other countries.  Next, Table 3 shows that OECD, MENA 
and other Non-OECD countries all decreased their reliance on international trade taxes between 
1982-84 and 1995-97.  Another trend is greater reliance over time on domestic taxes on goods 
and services in these groups, particularly in OECD countries and other Non-OECD countries.  
While taxes on income, profits and capital gains, domestic taxes on goods and services and taxes 
on international trade and transactions are the three major tax revenue sources for the MENA and 
other Non-OECD countries, OECD countries differ by relying significantly more on social 
security contributions than on international trade taxes.  It should be noted that Table 3 does not 
                                                 
8 See Appendix Table 1 for a list of sample countries classified into different regional or economic groups.   
  7show the variability in tax structures within each country group.  The variability in tax structures 
in the MENA countries can be better seen in Figures 1 through 8. 
3.  Tax Structures: Theoretical Considerations 
   Tax structures could be analyzed in a number of theoretical models.  Optimal taxation 
literature points to ways to make tax systems “better” in terms of economic efficiency and equity 
(Ramsey, 1927; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Diamond, 1975; Stern, 1987).  Slemrod, (1990) 
distinguishes between optimal taxation and optimal tax systems and argues that the 
administration of taxes or the “technology of raising taxes” is a critical element in tax systems.   
  The mechanisms behind the choice of tax instruments by governments have been 
formally addressed in the recent literature on the positive theory of tax structure
9.  One approach 
is to derive a politically optimal tax structure.  Hettich and Winer (1984), and recently Kenny 
and Winer (2001) used a probabilistic voting model to explain the general nature of tax systems.  
In the probabilistic voting model, the objective of each political group or party is to maximize 
the expected votes to win an election.  It is different from the median voter model in the way that 
there is an uncertainty involved regarding voters’ behavior.  Voters derive benefit from the 
public good while incurring income and welfare losses from taxation.  The cost and benefit of 
taxation determine the probability that each voter will vote for the incumbent.  A politically 
optimal tax structure dictates that marginal political cost of increasing a tax rate should be equal 
to its marginal political benefit for all activities and voters.  Using such a framework as a basis 
for empirical work, Kenny and Winer (2001) argued that all taxes are subject to increasing 
marginal political cost.  They found that as the scale or size of total revenues increases, countries 
rely more on taxes with large bases.   
                                                 
9 Hettich and Winer (1999) provide an extensive survey of political economy models of taxation. 
 
 
  8  Since governance is about political and administrative authority, the relationship between 
governance and tax structures can be addressed within the political economy models of tax 
structures.  However, some recent studies examined the direct link between components of 
governance, particularly corruption, and taxation.  The consensus from the literature on 
corruption and taxation is that total tax revenue is lower in countries that suffer from high 
corruption.  Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) and Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 
(2000) argue that the tax revenue officially received by the government fall below the total taxes 
paid by taxpayers in highly corrupt economies, leading to a lower tax ratio (ratio of tax revenue 
to GDP).  Barreto and Alm (2003) found, within a theoretical endogenous growth framework, 
that “optimal size of government is smaller in an economy with corruption than in one without 
corruption.”  Since quality of governance is associated with low corruption
10, a positive 
relationship is expected between quality of governance and the tax ratio. 
  Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) pointed out that similar analyses and consensus could not be 
found for the effect of corruption on tax composition.  However, they made plausible arguments 
and raised interesting questions on this issue.  For example, referring to recent surveys, they 
asserted that corruption might be more prevalent in customs.  They asked whether corruption 
reduces taxes from customs more than other taxes.  They also argued that revenue from value 
added taxes (VAT) might be more resistant to corruption.  Their results showed that corruption 
reduces the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, individual income taxes and VAT, sales and turnover 
taxes.  Contrary to the surveys mentioned above, they find no relationship between international 
trade taxes and corruption.  While these results are useful for comparison, Tanzi and Davoodi did 
                                                 
10 The coefficient of correlation between quality of governance and corruption in government in the MENA 
countries is 0.93.  Note again that, according to the IRIS dataset, higher values of the corruption indicator means 
lower corruption in government. 
  9not use tax shares (ratio of each tax to total tax revenue) in their tax structure analysis; they also 
focused only on corruption rather than examining the more general concept of governance.   
  Barreto and Alm (2003) differ from other studies by addressing directly the theoretical 
link between corruption and optimal tax structure.  In their endogenous growth model, there are 
two agents, a public agent that captures the corruption income and pays only the consumption tax 
and a private agent that pays both the income and the consumption tax.  They show that the 
public agent prefers a tax structure with higher income tax and a lower consumption tax while 
the reverse is true for the private agent.  In the presence of corruption, maximization of a 
utilitarian social welfare function that derives their optimal tax result produces an optimal tax 
structure that weighs more heavily on consumption taxes than income taxes.  It would be 
interesting to see in the following sections whether such relationship holds for the MENA 
countries. 
  The relationship between demographics and the tax structures is less clear.  For one thing, 
there is only scant literature that addresses this issue.  Among the few studies on the relationship 
between demographic change and total tax revenues, Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (2000) 
show, using time series data for Greece for the period 1960-95, that low fertility rates and high 
old-age dependency ratio (ratio of elderly to working young) have led to a decrease in total tax 
revenues.  Hence they found evidence of a positive link between population growth and tax 
revenues.  Another study by Goudswaard and Van de Kar (1994) confirms this relationship for 
Netherlands.  In their simulation study, tax revenue rises with population growth until 2010 and 
falls after 2030 when the population starts its decline.  Links between demographic changes and 
  10the composition of taxes can not be clearly determined from the theory, which is certainly an 
area that needs further study.
11
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Empirical Strategy 
While the focus of this paper is the MENA countries, comparison with other regions and 
countries would give a more accurate picture of where MENA countries stand in terms of 
governance, demographics and tax structures.  Hence, the empirical analysis is conducted in two 
stages.  In the first stage, the effect of governance and demography on tax structures is shown 
only for a sample of 12 MENA countries.  In the second stage, a larger sample that includes both 
MENA countries and OECD and other Non-OECD countries is used to show the differences 
between these country groups.  
4.2 Dependent Variables 
  The empirical analysis uses tax ratio (ratio of tax revenue to GDP) and seven major 
components of total tax revenue.  Accordingly, total tax revenue (T) is defined as  
         T PCT SST PAYT PROPT GST ITO T =+ + + + + + , (1) 
where, PCT is personal and corporate taxes on income, profits and capital gains, SST is social 
security contributions from both the employees and the employers, PAYT is payroll taxes, 
PROPT is property taxes, GST is domestic taxes on goods and services taxes, IT is international 
trade taxes and OT is all other taxes.  Accordingly, tax shares are defined as the ratio of each tax 
















++ + + + + = 1.     (2) 
                                                 
11 In a series of simulations for the developed and developing regions, Tosun (2004b) shows that a decrease in the 
population growth rate in the developed region could lead to a decline in the income tax rate.  Simulations with 
international migration show that the flow of young workers to the developed region could offset this decline.  Thus, 
Tosun (2004b) found a positive link between the population growth rate and the income tax rate in a stylized model. 
  11  Tax structure changes can be examined by using each of the seven tax shares in (2) as 
dependent variables in regressions that form a seemingly unrelated system (Kenny and Winer, 
2001).  In this seemingly unrelated system, the value of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables would also sum to 0.  The regression analysis uses tax ratio (TG D P ) and seven tax 
shares in (2) as dependent variables.   
4.3 Explanatory Variables and Other Control Variables 
The key explanatory variables are Governance and Demography.  Governance is the 
quality of governance indicator, which is the average of corruption in government, rule of law 
and bureaucratic quality from the IRIS data.  Demography represents a set of various 
demographic variables shown earlier in Table 2 – population growth rate, share of labor force in 
total population, share of population in 15-64 age group, share of population in 0-14 age group 
and share of urban population in total population.  Based on the arguments in section 3, an 
increase in the quality of governance is expected to increase the tax ratio and decrease the 
reliance on domestic taxes on goods and services.  Population growth rate, greater share of labor 
force and share of population in 15-64 group are expected to increase the tax ratio since such 
demographic changes would increase the base of most taxes.  The share of population in the 0-14 
age group is not expected to have a positive effect on the tax ration since the contribution of this 
economically inactive group to tax revenue is expected to be small.  However, the effect of these 
changes on the tax shares is not clear.  Nevertheless, there may be a positive relationship 
between, for example, share of labor force and payroll, social security and income taxes.  As for 
the share of urban population, Kenny and Winer (2001) argue that “land is more valuable in 
urban and densely populated areas and thus offers a larger tax base.” (Kenny and Winer, 2001: 
26).  Their results show that population density has a positive and significant effect on the 
  12property tax share.  Hence, a similar relationship may be observed between the share of urban 
population and property taxes. 
The remaining control variables include Openness, which is defined as the ratio of the 
sum of exports and imports to the gross domestic product.
12  A liberalized trade structure is 
expected to trigger a shift from international trade taxes to other taxes in the tax structure, 
particularly domestic taxes on goods and services.
13   GDP growth controls for the general 
economic performance of low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries.  In 
addition, GDP growth directly affects tax bases.
14  While there is no consensus on which tax 
base is more or less affected by GDP growth, the proposition that different tax bases will be 
affected differently, as economic growth occurs, can be a strong one.  Groves and Kahn (1952) 
and Holcombe and Sobel (1997) provide two examples of the income elasticity comparisons for 
different taxes.  Both studies, using data from the United States, show considerable dispersion in 
income elasticities of various taxes.  Holcombe and Sobel (1997) also distinguish between long-
run and short-run elasticity estimates and show that there is greater variability in short-run 
estimates.  Tosun and Abizadeh (2003) show that growth in GDP per capita has had a significant 
impact on the tax structures of OECD countries.  The authors argue that the greatest impact was 
indeed on personal income taxes and goods and services taxes.  Finally, year dummies are used 
to capture the effect of any time specific events.       
 
                                                 
12 While this measure of openness is widely used in the literature, it is argued to be imperfect particularly in the 
context of the MENA region.  For instance, liberalizing producer goods does not have the same meaning and impact 
as liberalizing consumer goods.  However, the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to the gross domestic product 
appears to be the only common openness indicator available particularly for panel data analysis. 
13 Keen and Ligthart (2002) argued that replacement of import duties and export taxes with domestic consumption 
taxes improves welfare and increases revenues.  However, while Tosun (2004a) found evidence of this for the Non-
OECD countries in general, he did not find such relationship in the MENA countries. 
14 GDP growth was chosen to GDP itself due to strong evidence of multicollinearity between GDP and other 
explanatory variables in the regression.   
  134.4 Empirical Specification 
As also argued by Kenny and Winer (2001), a way to efficiently estimate the seemingly 
unrelated system in (2) is to include exactly the same set of explanatory variables described in 
the previous section in each regression.
15  Fixed-effects and random-effects procedures are the 
two typical approaches for estimating panel data.  A fixed effects model has the advantage of 
removing the bias from the estimation caused by a possible correlation between the explanatory 
variables and time-invariant country specific effects.  This approach in a sense uses countries as 
controls for themselves.  Another important characteristic of the fixed effects model is that it 
produces consistent estimates even when the random effects model is valid.  The dependent 
variable as defined in section 4.2 is either the tax ratio (T GDP) or the share of each tax in total 
tax revenues as defined in equation (2).  The following specification is used to run regressions 
for the MENA countries:  
1 ,
j
it it it it i t it Tax Governance Demography Z f α βγ η =+ + + +++ φ ε  (3) 
where “
j
it Tax ” is the tax j (either the tax ratio of the share of the specific tax) in country i at time 
t.  Governance is the quality of governance indicator as described earlier and Demography is a 
vector of demographic variables as listed before.  fi represents the unobservable country specific, 
time-invariant effects,   represents unobservable time specific effects t φ
16, and  represents time-
variant unsystematic effects and is i.i.d.  Z
it ε
it includes all remaining control variables that are 
described in the previous section.  In equation (3) the coefficients of interest are   and the 
coefficient vector .     
1 β
γ
                                                 
15  A combined seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model would be preferred to running separate regression 
equations when explanatory variables differ between these equations.  SUR would then be relevant because the 
errors associated with the dependent variables may be correlated.  However, when same set of explanatory variables 
is used, SUR gives the same results in terms of coefficients and standard errors as separate regressions. 
16 The year 1982 is excluded to avoid the dummy variable trap. 
  14  In the second stage of the empirical analysis, sample is raised to 61 countries that include 
MENA, OECD and other Non-OECD countries.  While the same set of explanatory variables as 
in equation (3) are used, interaction terms are added to these new regressions to identify the 
differences in results between the country groups.  For these regressions, the specification in 
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=
 (4) 
where MENA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is a MENA country in a 
given year and 0 otherwise and Ot.Non-OECD is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
country is a Non-OECD country other than MENA and 0 otherwise.  Dummy variable and 
corresponding interaction terms for the OECD countries are omitted to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity.  The specifications in (3) and (4) will be used in two different sets of 
regressions in section 5. 
4.5 Data Sources 
Data for the regression analysis comes from three main sources: the IRIS data created 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2004), Government Finance Statistics CD-
ROM (IMF, 2003) and World Development Indicators CD-ROM (World Bank, 2003).  The 
period for analysis is 1982-1997, due to data availability.  The pre-1982 data is not available for 
many countries and for many data series.  As shown in Appendix Table 1, there are 61 countries 
in the sample of which, 26 are OECD countries.  Out of 35 Non-OECD countries, 12 are MENA 
countries.  Descriptive statistics for the variables used in regression specifications (3) and (4) are 
presented in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. 
 
  155. Empirical Results 
Using econometric specifications in equations (3) and (4), fixed effects estimation with 
panel data is used in all regressions.  As a start, a simple F-test is used for the joint significance 
of the dummies that form the fixed effects.  In all regressions, the null hypothesis, which says 
that fixed-effect dummies are “not significant”, is resoundingly rejected.
17  In addition to this, a 
Hausman specification test
18 for random effects is conducted to check the robustness of the fixed 
effects specification.  In a random effects model, the assumption is that individual country effects 
fi in equations (3) and (4) and all other regressors shown in the same equations are uncorrelated.  
However, if they are correlated then the coefficient estimates of the regressors in a random 
effects model will be inconsistent and systematically different from those for a fixed effects 
model, and the fixed effects model is strictly a better choice.
19  In Hausman specification test, the 
null hypothesis says that coefficient estimates of the fixed effects and random effects models are 
not systematically different from each other.  Hausman specification tests show that fixed effects 
specification is clearly more appropriate for some of the regressions.  However, the tests were 
inconclusive in others.  To further check whether the fixed-effects estimation is indeed 
appropriate, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects is used.  Random effects 
model is rejected in all regressions.  Therefore, the fixed effects estimation is used for 
comparison of results. 
MENA Country Regressions 
  The results for the first set of regressions for only the MENA countries are shown in 
Table 6.  The results for the level of taxes in column (1) are as expected.  Quality of governance, 
                                                 
17 See Baltagi (1995: 12) for the specifics of this test. 
18 See Hausman (1978) for the original description of this test. 
19 Fixed effects regression produces unbiased and consistent estimates even when the random effects model is valid.  
However, the fixed effects estimator is not as efficient as the random effects estimator. 
  16population growth and the share of population in the 15-64 age group all have positive and 
statistically significant effects on the tax ratio.  These effects are in line with the arguments and 
expectations set forth in sections 3 and 4.3.  It is particularly noteworthy to see a large positive 
effect from the quality of governance indicator.  However, the share of population in the 0-14 
age group has a large negative and statistically significant effect on the tax ratio.  As argued 
before, this is the economically inactive group that may be limiting the purchasing power of 
households without contributing much to tax revenue.  This is an important result for the MENA 
countries since the 0-14 age group is the fastest growing age group in these countries.  
Nevertheless, it is a relief to see that the positive effect of the working age population in the 15-
64 age group balances this negative effect. 
  The results for the tax shares shown in columns (2)-(8) are not as strong as the ones for 
the tax ratio.  Quality of governance has a significant and negative effect on only the payroll tax 
share and the property tax share which are two fairly insignificant revenue sources for the 
MENA countries.  The results for the income tax, goods and services tax and trade tax are not 
only significant but also contrary to our expectations based on previous empirical and theoretical 
studies.  For example, an optimal tax mix as shown by Barreto and Alm (2003) should lead to 
greater reliance on income taxes (or lesser reliance on goods and services taxes) with an increase 
in the quality of governance.  The signs of the coefficients of the quality of governance variable 
in the income tax share and goods and services tax share regressions are showing an opposite 
relationship.  As in Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), there is no significant relationship between the 
quality of governance and the trade tax share.  On the other hand, we see expected positive 
relationships between the share of labor force and the payroll tax share and the social security tax 
share.  In addition, similar to their effect on the tax ratio, the share of population in the 15-64 age 
  17group and the share of population in the 0-14 age group have, respectively, significant positive 
and significant negative effects on the goods and services tax share. 
Regressions for all 61 Countries 
  Regression results in Table 7 bring out the significance of governance and demographics 
for the tax structure in the MENA countries relative to other country groups.  Starting with the 
results for the tax ratio in column (1), as the coefficient of Governance*MENA shows, the 
quality of governance has a particularly strong positive and significant effect on the tax ratio in 
the MENA countries relative to OECD and other Non-OECD countries.  This, together with the 
result in Table 6, shows the significance of governance for the level of taxation in the MENA 
countries.  The share of population in both the 15-64 and 0-14 age groups have significant 
positive effects on the tax ratio in the MENA countries.  This contrasts with the negative and 
significant effect for the 0-14 age group shown in Table 6.  Hence, this economically inactive 
age group is still an asset for revenue generation in the MENA countries compared to other 
country groups.   
The results in Table 7 for the tax shares in columns (2)-(8) are more encouraging 
compared to results in Table 6.  The quality of governance has a positive and significant effect 
on the social security tax and other tax shares and a negative and significant effect on payroll tax, 
property tax and goods and services tax shares.  The estimated negative effect for the goods and 
services tax, which is a major tax revenue source for the MENA countries, is in line with the 
optimal tax mix result of Barreto and Alm (2003).  According to their theory, with a decrease in 
corruption, which would mean greater quality of governance in our empirical analysis, optimal 
mix of taxes shifts a way from consumption to income taxes.  While, the negative and significant 
effect for the goods and services tax confirms this, the effect on the income tax share is not 
  18significant and has the opposite sign.  Table 7 shows that the quality of governance may have 
played a bigger role in determining the tax structures of the MENA countries compared to other 
Non-OECD countries.  The demographic variables have significant effects only on payroll tax, 
property tax, the goods and services tax and other tax shares for the MENA countries.  There is 
again a positive and significant effect of the share of labor force on the payroll tax share for the 
MENA group.  The share of urban population has positive and significant effects on payroll and 
property tax shares in the MENA countries.  This is similar to the finding in Kenny and Winer 
(2001) that population density has a positive and significant effect on the property tax share.  
Overall, results in Table 7 show that demographic variables seem to have a more significant 
effect on the tax structure of the MENA countries when compared to the results in Table 6.  
However, Table 7 also shows that demographics may have played a bigger role in the tax 
structures of other Non-OECD countries compared to the MENA countries. 
6. Concluding Remarks  
  This paper examined the tax structures of the MENA countries by focusing on the quality 
of governance and demographic changes as two influential factors in region’s economies.  
Results from regressions on the MENA countries and the ones based on a larger sample of 61 
countries show that these factors affected the level of taxation, measured by the tax ratio, more 
strongly than they affected the tax composition.  While the quality of governance seems to have 
affected the tax structures in MENA countries more than in other comparable Non-OECD 
countries, demographics seems to have played a bigger role in determining the tax structures in 
other Non-OECD countries.  However, neither of these factors explained changes in the income 
tax share satisfactorily.  One key result is that the increase in the quality of governance has 
decreased the reliance on domestic taxes on goods and services.  There are three important policy 
  19implications of these results.  First, increasing the quality of governance has paid off in terms of 
revenue generation in the MENA countries.  Considering that MENA countries have fallen 
behind other comparable countries in quality of governance in the past two decades, 
improvement in governance is expected to bring more tax revenue in the future.  Second, failure 
to find a significant relationship between quality of governance and income tax share or 
demographic variables and income tax share may be worrisome since income tax is a major 
revenue source for almost all countries in the sample and that theory suggests a greater reliance 
on this tax in the optimal tax mix with lower corruption or higher quality of governance.  More 
research is needed to shed light on the forces that affect income taxes.  Finally, population 
growth and increases in the share of young population, particularly the working-age group (15-
64) have impacted positively on the level of taxation.  However, there are mixed results on the 
impact of the youngest age group (0-14).  The tremendous growth in this age group in the 
MENA countries can create opportunities for economic growth, hence be a demographic gift, if 
it is matched with improvements in the quality of governance.  Otherwise, as the results suggest, 
it may very well be a demographic curse. 
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Table 1. Changes in the Indicators of the Quality of Governance in the MENA and other Countries 
(1982-1997) 
 
MENA  1982-84 1988-90 1995-97 1982-89 1990-97 
Quality of governance
a,b 2.12 2.68 3.70 2.49 3.32
Corruption in government
b 2.26 2.83 3.11 2.52 3.04
Rule of law (law and order tradition)
b 1.98 2.28 4.70 2.32 3.80
Bureaucratic quality
b 2.11 2.92 3.28 2.63 3.14
Ethnic tensions
c 2.83 2.95 5.08 2.90 4.26
Repudiation of government contracts
c 4.35 4.68 8.59 4.50 7.48
Expropriation risk
c 4.23 5.29 9.44 4.86 8.23
       
Other  Non-OECD  1982-84 1988-90 1995-97 1982-89 1990-97 
Quality of governance
a,b 2.97 2.98 3.73 3.01 3.43
Corruption in government
b 3.20 3.11 3.37 3.17 3.33
Rule of law (law and order tradition)
b 2.81 2.66 4.27 2.79 3.57
Bureaucratic quality
b 2.91 3.17 3.54 3.06 3.38
Ethnic tensions
c 3.49 3.19 4.49 3.34 3.96
Repudiation of government contracts
c 5.54 5.79 8.31 5.55 7.51
Expropriation risk
c 5.91 6.45 9.27 6.04 8.27
   
OECD  1982-84 1988-90 1995-97 1982-89 1990-97 
Quality of governance
a,b 5.46 5.32 5.49 5.37 5.49
Corruption in government
b 5.40 5.23 5.03 5.31 5.21
Rule of law (law and order tradition)
b 5.50 5.35 5.86 5.39 5.70
Bureaucratic quality
b 5.49 5.37 5.59 5.40 5.56
Ethnic tensions
c 5.17 5.09 5.17 5.07 5.22
Repudiation of government contracts
c 8.51 9.30 9.64 8.79 9.51
Expropriation risk
c 8.66 9.74 9.95 9.06 9.89
Source: Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center, University of Maryland, based on 2003 International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data by the PRS Group. 
a Quality of governance is the average of corruption in government, rule of law and bureaucratic quality. 
b These indicators range between 0 and 6, higher values indicating improvements in those variables. 
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Table 2. Demographic Changes in MENA and other Countries (1982-97) 
 
MENA  1982-84 1988-90 1995-97 1982-89 1990-97 
Annual population growth rate (%)  3.43 2.46 2.84 3.31 2.67
Share of labor force in total population (%)  34.52 35.02 35.75 34.73 35.45
Share of age 15-64 in total population (%)  55.14 56.23 57.63 55.76 57.39
Share of age 0-14 in total population (%)  41.36 40.97 38.86 41.17 40.03
Share of urban population in total population (%)  53.56 58.04 62.31 55.46 60.89
       
Other  Non-OECD  1982-84 1988-90 1995-97 1982-89 1990-97 
Annual population growth rate (%)  2.09 2.24 1.87 2.15 1.97
Share of labor force in total population (%)  40.86 42.02 43.62 41.34 42.89
Share of age 15-64 in total population (%)  56.91 58.56 60.05 57.62 59.44
Share of age 0-14 in total population (%)  38.27 36.69 34.43 37.66 35.30
Share of urban population in total population (%)  49.08 52.61 55.39 50.54 54.88
    
OECD  1982-84 1988-90 1995-97 1982-89 1990-97 
Annual population growth rate (%)  0.50 0.71 0.58 0.56 0.64
Share of labor force in total population (%)  46.03 47.58 48.68 46.68 48.34
Share of age 15-64 in total population (%)  65.30 66.49 66.51 65.93 66.48
Share of age 0-14 in total population (%)  22.20 20.46 19.40 21.44 19.73
Share of urban population in total population (%)  73.18 74.84 76.96 73.87 76.23
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Table 3. Changes in Tax Composition (1982-97) 
Shares in Total Tax Revenues
a
MENA  1982-84  1988-90 1995-97 1982-89 1990-97 
Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains  0.30  0.27  0.29  0.27  0.29 
Social Security Contributions  0.09  0.09  0.07  0.09  0.08 
Payroll  Tax  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Taxes  on  Property  0.03  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services  0.20  0.29  0.30  0.29  0.29 
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions  0.34  0.29  0.27  0.28  0.27 
Other  Taxes  0.03  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
        
Other  Non-OECD  1982-84  1988-90 1995-97 1982-89 1990-97 
Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains  0.35 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.33
Social Security Contributions  0.08 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10
Payroll Tax  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Taxes on Property  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services  0.33 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.35
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions  0.19 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.16
Other Taxes  0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
        
OECD  1982-84  1988-90 1995-97 1982-89 1990-97 
Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains  0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.36
Social Security Contributions  0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26
Payroll Tax  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Taxes on Property  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services  0.30 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.32
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions  0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01
Other Taxes  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Source: Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM (IMF), 2003. 
a Tax shares may not sum to 1 due to rounding. The tax classifications are adopted from IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics.  Taxes on income, profits and capital gains comprise individual income and corporate 
income taxes; social security contributions include contributions to the social security programs by 
employees, employers and self-employed or nonemployed; property taxes include recurrent taxes on 
immovable property and net wealth, estate, inheritance and gift taxes, taxes on financial and capital 
transactions and all other recurrent and nonrecurrent taxes on property; domestic taxes on goods and services 
include general sales, turnover, or value-added taxes and excise taxes; international trade taxes include 
customs and other import duties, taxes on exports, and taxes on the profits of export or import monopolies; 
and other taxes include all other unclassified taxes.  
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Observations Mean Standard 
Error  Minimum Maximum
Tax ratio (% ratio of total tax revenue to GDP) 
172 12.99 7.92 0 28
Personal and corporate taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains (% share)  175 28.34 20.52 0 92
Social security contributions (% share)  175 8.37 10.35 0 37
Payroll tax (% share)  175 1.30 1.93 0 8
Property taxes (% share)  174 2.37 2.32 0 20
Domestic taxes on goods and services in total tax revenues 
(% share)  175 27.79 23.03 0 97
International trade taxes (% share)  175 28.64 17.79 0 79
Other taxes (% share)  174 3.18 4.14 0 17
Quality of governance  180 2.91 0.81 1 5
GDP growth (%)  180 0.98 6.31 -22 30
Openness (% ratio of sum of exports and imports to GDP)  177 80.76 43.70 9 226
Population growth rate (%)  192 2.99 3.78 -44 12
Share of labor force in total population (%)  192 35.09 6.97 24 53
Share of population age 15-64 in total population (%)  192 56.58 7.06 45 90
Share of population age 0-14 in total population (%)  192 40.60 6.16 27 55
Share of urban population in total population (%)  192 58.18 21.39 20 96
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Observations Mean Standard 
Error  Minimum Maximum
Tax ratio (% ratio of total tax revenue to GDP)  933 21.64 9.70 0 51
Personal and corporate taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains (% share)  934 33.65 17.60 0 92
Social security contributions (% share)  934 15.92 16.90 0 59
Payroll tax (% share)  933 0.79 1.64 0 8
Property taxes (% share)  931 2.25 2.40 0 20
Domestic taxes on goods and services in total tax revenues 
(% share)  931 32.26 15.55 0 97
International trade taxes (% share)  931 13.26 14.79 0 79
Other taxes (% share)  931 1.89 2.97 0 18
Other-Non-OECD (dummy variable)  976 0.40 0.49 0 1
Quality of governance  954 4.05 1.45 1 6
Quality of governance * MENA  954 0.55 1.19 0 5
Quality of governance * Other-Non-OECD  954 1.30 1.71 0 6
GDP growth (%)  964 1.84 4.39 -22 30
Openness (% ratio of sum of exports and imports to GDP)  961 73.10 54.90 9 407
Population growth rate (%)  976 1.67 2.03 -44 12
Population growth * MENA  976 0.59 2.05 -44 12
Population growth * Other-Non-OECD  976 0.83 1.17 -3 6
Share of labor force in total population (%)  976 42.87 7.00 24 60
Share of labor * MENA  976 6.90 14.29 0 53
Share of labor * Other-Non-OECD  976 17.01 20.90 0 60
Share of population age 15-64 in total population (%)  976 61.18 6.59 45 90
Share of population age 15-64 * MENA  976 11.13 22.72 0 90
Share of population age 15-64 * Other-Non-OECD  976 23.61 28.95 0 74
Share of population age 0-14 in total population (%)  976 31.02 10.56 15 55
Share of population age 0-14 * MENA  976 7.99 16.38 0 55
Share of population age 0-14 * Other-Non-OECD  976 14.75 18.58 0 50
Share of urban population in total population (%)  976 62.58 23.23 11 100
Share of urban population * MENA  976 11.44 25.00 0 96
Share of urban population * Other-Non-OECD  976 21.15 30.61 0 100
Source:  Author’s calculations.  
 
Table 6. Fixed Effects Regressions for Tax Ratio and Tax Shares (12 MENA Countries) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Tax  Income Social Payroll  Property  G&S  Trade  Other 
  Ratio  Tax Sec.  Tax  Tax Tax Tax Tax    Tax 
  (Tax/GDP)  Share Share Share Share Share Share Share 
 
Quality of  0.982
** -0.353 -0.040 -1.615
*** -0.434
*  0.564 2.565 -0.645 
Governance  (0.476) (1.317) (0.862) (0.222) (0.225) (1.211) (1.770) (0.464) 
 
GDP growth  0.004  -0.212
***  -0.029 -0.009 -0.018 0.033  0.231
** 0.008 
(%)  (0.027) (0.078) (0.051) (0.013) (0.013) (0.072) (0.105) (0.028) 
 
Openness 0.043
** 0.069  -0.002 -0.025
*** -0.019
** 0.063  -0.058  -0.026
*
  (0.017) (0.045) (0.030) (0.008) (0.008) (0.042) (0.061) (0.016) 
 
Population 0.257
*  -0.055 -0.319 0.089  -0.049 0.452  0.011  -0.134 
Growth  (%)  (0.145) (0.426) (0.279) (0.072) (0.073) (0.392) (0.573) (0.150) 
 
Labor Force  -0.043  0.220  1.672
*** 0.568
*** -0.404
**  -0.988 -2.047 0.956
*** 
(%  of  pop.)  (0.320) (0.945) (0.618) (0.159) (0.161) (0.869) (1.270) (0.332) 
 
Pop. 15-64  0.281
** 0.107  -0.240 -0.074 -0.033 0.765
** 0.056  -0.581
***
(%  of  pop.)  (0.123) (0.362) (0.237) (0.061) (0.062) (0.333) (0.486) (0.127) 
 
Pop. 0-14  -0.353
***  0.269 0.339 0.067 -0.045  -1.215
*** 0.144  0.440
***
(%  of  pop.)  (0.135) (0.398) (0.260) (0.067) (0.068) (0.366) (0.534) (0.139) 
 
Urban Pop.  0.067  -0.088  0.321
**  0.035 0.010 0.155 -0.260  -0.167
**
(%  of  pop.)  (0.067) (0.197) (0.129) (0.033) (0.034) (0.181) (0.264) (0.069) 
 






  (12.991) (38.357) (25.092) (6.452)  (6.531)  (35.265) (51.540) (13.455) 
 
Observations  157 160 160 160 159 160 160 159 
R-squared  0.96 0.93 0.92 0.83 0.83 0.96 0.87 0.86 
 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
***  s i g n i f i c a n t   a t   1 %           
Dependent variables are shown in column headings. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Country and year dummy variables are not shown in the table. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Tax  Income Social Payroll  Property  G&S  Trade  Other 
  Ratio  Tax Sec.  Tax  Tax Tax Tax Tax    Tax 
  (Tax/GDP)  Share Share Share Share Share Share Share 
 
Other -89.638
***  89.574 59.007 -29.383
***  -3.324 56.874 -176.496
** 12.610 
Non-OECD  (32.396) (71.979) (58.926) (10.258) (15.278) (77.311) (69.781) (21.709) 
 
Quality of  -1.740
*** 1.126  -4.994
*** 0.044  0.584
*** 2.995
*** 0.620  -0.324 
Governance  (0.407) (0.903) (0.740) (0.129) (0.192) (0.970) (0.876) (0.273) 
 
Governance* 2.168




*** 1.072  0.935
**
MENA  (0.546) (1.213) (0.993) (0.173) (0.257) (1.302) (1.175) (0.366) 
 
Governance* 2.077
*** -0.305  5.074
***  -0.005 -0.233 -3.368
*** -1.090  0.035 
Ot.  Non-OECD  (0.458) (1.017) (0.833) (0.145) (0.216) (1.093) (0.986) (0.307) 
 
GDP  growth  0.004  -0.045 -0.045 -0.005 -0.014 -0.023 0.151
*** -0.022
*




*** 0.007  -0.004
*  -0.002 -0.013 -0.031
* -0.018
***
  (0.008) (0.017) (0.014) (0.002) (0.004) (0.018) (0.017) (0.005) 
 
Population  0.065 0.123 -1.265
* 0.324
** 0.266  -1.092 1.479
* 0.209 
Growth(%)  (0.408) (0.907) (0.743) (0.129) (0.193) (0.974) (0.879) (0.274) 
 
Pop.Growth*  0.219 -0.240  1.051 -0.281
**  -0.328 1.605  -1.428 -0.423 
MENA  (0.437) (0.971) (0.795) (0.138) (0.206) (1.043) (0.941) (0.293) 
 







Ot.  Non-OECD  (0.457) (1.014) (0.830) (0.145) (0.215) (1.089) (0.983) (0.306) 
 
Labor Force  0.604
*** -0.282  0.706
** 0.051  0.297
*** 0.160  -0.873
** -0.073 
(%  of  pop.)  (0.181) (0.402) (0.329) (0.057) (0.085) (0.432) (0.390) (0.122) 
 
Labor Force*  -0.761
**  0.301 0.659 0.722
*** -0.634
*** -1.591
* -0.745  1.241
***
MENA  (0.383) (0.851) (0.697) (0.121) (0.181) (0.914) (0.825) (0.257) 
 
Labor  Force*  -0.167 0.432  -0.111 0.052  -0.344
*** 0.405  -0.766  0.144 





Table 7. cont’d 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Tax  Income Social Payroll  Property  G&S  Trade  Other 
  Ratio  Tax Sec.  Tax  Tax Tax Tax Tax    Tax 
  (Tax/GDP)  Share Share Share Share Share Share Share 
 
Pop. 15-64  -1.037
***  0.401  -0.021 -0.118 -0.129 0.318  -0.899
* 0.446
***
(%  of  pop.)  (0.238) (0.529) (0.433) (0.075) (0.112) (0.569) (0.514) (0.160) 
 
Pop. 15-64*  1.307
***  -0.452  -0.141  0.012 0.087 0.546 0.971
* -1.005
***
MENA  (0.270) (0.599) (0.490) (0.085) (0.127) (0.644) (0.581) (0.181) 
 
Pop. 15-64*  1.040
***  -0.871 -0.756 0.203
** 0.231
* -0.552  2.253
*** -0.495
**
Ot.  Non-OECD  (0.294) (0.653) (0.534) (0.093) (0.139) (0.701) (0.632) (0.197) 
 
Pop. 0-14  -0.964
***  -0.606 0.602  -0.104 0.122  -0.065 -0.302 0.390
***
(%  of  pop.)  (0.214) (0.476) (0.390) (0.068) (0.101) (0.511) (0.462) (0.144) 
 
Pop. 0-14 *  0.592
** 0.652  -0.268 0.248
*** -0.148  -1.211
* 0.535  0.140 
MENA  (0.260) (0.578) (0.473) (0.082) (0.123) (0.620) (0.560) (0.174) 
 
Pop. 0-14 *  1.162
***  -0.545 -0.765 0.277
***  -0.003 -0.255 1.468
** -0.263 
Ot.  Non-OECD  (0.317) (0.704) (0.576) (0.100) (0.149) (0.756) (0.683) (0.212) 
 
Urban Pop.  0.193
*** -0.148  0.344
*** -0.044
** -0.078
*** 0.195  -0.152  -0.108
***
(%  of  pop.)  (0.055) (0.122) (0.100) (0.017) (0.026) (0.131) (0.118) (0.037) 
 
Urban  Pop.*  -0.125 0.128  -0.190 0.132
*** 0.103
***  -0.130 -0.052 -0.009 
MENA  (0.082) (0.181) (0.148) (0.026) (0.039) (0.195) (0.176) (0.055) 
 
Urban Pop.*  -0.151
** -0.418
*** -0.067  0.089
*** 0.066
* -0.204  0.298
* 0.238
***
Ot.  Non-OECD  (0.072) (0.161) (0.132) (0.023) (0.034) (0.173) (0.156) (0.048) 
 
Constant 87.181
*** 27.445  -11.322  12.058
* 4.383  -32.207  117.507
** -18.804 
  (21.675) (48.159) (39.426) (6.864)  (10.222) (51.743) (46.703) (14.528) 
 
Observations  908 909 909 908 906 906 906 906 
R-squared  0.96 0.94 0.96 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.82 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
***  s i g n i f i c a n t   a t   1 %           
Dependent variables are shown in column headings. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 2: Income Tax Share and Quality of Governance (1982-97)
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Figure 8: Share of Other Taxes and Quality of Governance (1982-97)
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Formal definitions of the variables used in the IRIS data are written below.  These are excerpts 
from the ICRG. 
 
Corruption in Government  
 
Lower scores indicate "high government officials are likely to demand special payments" and 
that "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government" in the form 
of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax   assessment, 
police protection, or loans."   
 
Rule of Law (named “Law and Order Tradition” in ICRG)  
 
This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the 
established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes."  Higher scores 
indicate:  "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly 
succession of power."  Lower scores indicate: "a tradition of depending on physical force or 
illegal means to settle claims."  Upon changes in government new leaders "may be less likely to 
accept the obligations of the previous regime."   
 
Quality of the Bureaucracy  
 
High scores indicate "an established mechanism for recruitment and training," "autonomy from 
political pressure," and "strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 




This variable “measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, 
or language divisions.  Lower ratings are given to countries where racial and nationality tensions 
are high because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise.  Higher ratings 
are given to countries where tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist.”   
 
Risk of Repudiation of Contracts by Government 
 
“This indicator addresses the possibility that  foreign businesses, contractors, and consultants 
face the risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or 
scaling down" due to "an income drop, budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in 
government, or a change in government economic and social priorities."  Lower scores signify "a 
greater likelihood that a country will modify or repudiate a contract with a foreign business."  
 
Risk of Expropriation of Private Investment 
 
This variables evaluates the risk "outright confiscation and forced nationalization" of property.  
Lower ratings "are given to countries where expropriation of private foreign investment is a 
likely event." 
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Appendix Table 1.    List of Sample Countries
a 
 
OECD Non-OECD   
Australia Argentina  Sri  Lanka 
Austria  Bahrain (MENA)  Syria (MENA) 
Belgium Botswana  Thailand 
Canada Brazil  Tunisia  (MENA) 
Denmark Chile  U.A.E.  (MENA) 
Finland Cameroon  Uruguay 
France  Costa Rica  Yemen (MENA) 
Germany Egypt  (MENA)  Zambia 
Greece Ethiopia Zimbabwe 
Iceland India   
Ireland Indonesia   
Italy Iran  (MENA)   
Japan Israel   
Luxemburg Jordan  (MENA)   
Mexico Kenya   
Netherlands Kuwait  (MENA)   
New Zealand  Malaysia   
Norway Malta   
Portugal Morocco  (MENA)   
South Korea  Nigeria   
Spain Oman  (MENA)   
Turkey Panama   
Sweden Pakistan  (MENA)   
Switzerland Philippines   
United Kingdom  Singapore   
United States  South Africa   
  
a Note that Mexico and South Korea became OECD members in 1994 and 1996, respectively. 
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